Introduction
The recent global …nancial crisis has increased attention on the e¤ects of …scal stimulus. With limited room for further monetary easing, governments around the world responded by announcing massive …scal stimulus packages. Although …scal stimulus has helped to generate a more rapid global recovery than previously anticipated, …scal sustainability has become an issue of growing concern. In the Toronto Summit Declaration of 2010, the G-20 leaders announced that they are "recognizing the circumstances of Japan." Japan's current headline debt-to-output ratio is much higher than that of Greece, which is in the midst of a debt crisis. However, Japan did make progress with …scal consolidation in the 1980s. Responding to the rapid accumulation of public debt following the prolonged recession after the oil crisis in 1973, the Japanese Government started its consolidation e¤ort at the end of 1970s. Figure 1 plots the time series for aggregate e¤ective tax rates on capital in major countries as well as the debt-to-output ratio in Japan.
1 Although the 1980s was a time of decreasing capital taxation in many major countries, Figure 1 shows an upward trend in Japan; several measures designed to increase corporate tax revenues were introduced during that period. Once progress was made in …scal consolidation in the late 1980s, however, the Japanese Government started to follow the international trend of reducing corporate tax rates. Consequently, Japan's e¤ective capital tax rate is largely correlated with its debt-to-output ratio throughout the 1980s and 1990s as seen in Figure 1 . Figure 1 HereUnlike monetary policy, …scal policy cannot be implemented without a¤ecting government budgets. An increase in government spending must eventually be repaid through taxes, even if the spending increase is initially …nanced by debt. Under the rational expectations framework, households'behaviors are a¤ected by their expectations regarding future …scal adjustments to achieve government debt sustainability. Therefore, the macroeconomic e¤ects of …scal stimulus critically depend on how it is …nanced.
-Insert
Recently, Corsetti et al. (2009) and Corsetti et al. (2010) suggested that the stimulative e¤ects of …scal expansion could be ampli…ed by a "spending reversal" policy that would o¤set the initial expansion via future spending reductions below trend level. 3 Corsetti et al. (2009) have also shown that the dynamics underlying the spending reversal …t the U.S. time series data. In contrast, the debt stabilization that occurred in Japan in the 1980s owed much to capital taxation, as seen in Figure 1 . Financing debt via future taxation sounds straightforward, but the existing literature does not su¢ ciently explore the consequences of tax-…nanced …scal stimulus, especially in the case of distortionary taxes.
Once we introduce distortionary taxation instead of lump-sum taxation, a temporary substitution of debt for taxation increases economic variables, such as consumption, labor hours, investment, and output (see Trostel (1993) ). 4 Therefore delaying the timing of taxation to repay debt issued to …nance an increase in government spending has a positive e¤ect on the increases in economic variables after the …scal expansion. Furthermore, when di¤erent tax instruments are available, a choice of distortionary taxes to repay the debt a¤ects the time paths of economic variables because each tax has di¤erent distortionary e¤ects.
Motivated by Japan's distinct experience of …scal consolidation e¤orts during the 1980s and 1990s, this paper examines how debt-stabilizing tax rules a¤ect dynamic responses to …scal stimulus within a New Keynesian framework, focusing very much on its short-run e¤ects. For this purpose, a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model of the Japanese economy was estimated, featuring non-Ricardian households 5 with three distortionary tax rules, and the models were simulated under di¤erent tax rules.
The method of "new normative macroeconomics" has taken center stage in macro-adjustment or debt repayment have an important impact on the e¤ects of …scal expansion. Uhlig and Drautzburg (2010) have also examined the e¤ect of changing the speed of …scal adjustment and show that a slower adjustment raises the short-run government spending multiplier. Of the studies conducted within the New Keynesian framework, Forni et al. (2009) (FMS, hereafter) was the …rst to attempt to examine the e¤ects of …scal policy using an estimated DSGE model augmented by distortionary tax rules and non-Ricardian households.
To follow, three distortionary tax rules will be introduced into an otherwise standard Smets and Wouters (2003) New Keynesian model. In addition, we will also allow for the coexistence of non-Ricardian and Ricardian households in our extended version. The estimated model of the Japanese economy exhibits rather strong positive responses to a government spending shock regardless of its low share of non-Ricardian households.
Simulating the model under di¤erent tax rules showed that the debt-stabilizing tax rules employed in Japan during the 1980s and 1990s have helped to make the short-run multipliers large. The results of our analysis suggest that …scal stimulus becomes more e¤ective if the increase in government spending is initially …nanced by debt and if that debt is repaid largely via a gradual increase in capital income tax under an accommodative monetary policy. An increase in government spending leads to an increase in labor input which, in turn, increases investment. While the debt issued to …nance the spending increase must eventually be repaid through tax increases, the increase in labor input resulting from the …scal stimulus is dampened least when only the capital tax rate is raised to repay the debt. Although capital income taxation has a dampening e¤ect on investment, it is therefore possible to have an investment boom in the initial periods after …scal stimulus if the timing of capital taxation is su¢ ciently delayed. This paper suggests that, overall, distortionary tax policy rules play a critical role in determining the size of the multiplier in the short term.
Whereas most of the current workhorse DSGE models employed by policy institutions use non-Ricardian households to amplify the e¤ects of …scal stimulus, particular tax policy rules can be of even greater importance. In addition, this present paper considers three distortionary taxes as …nancing instruments and examines how the government spending multiplier can change under di¤erent tax rules, instead of relying on the recently suggested concept of a spending reversal. Therefore, this paper complements and adds a new dimension to the recent debate regarding the government spending multiplier.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the model is introduced in detail. Section 3 presents the estimation results and Section 4 presents the results of the simulations under alternative tax rules. Lastly, conclusions and new directions for future research are suggested in Section 5.
The Model

Households
There is a continuum of households indexed by n 2 [0; 1]. A fraction 1 ! of this households indexed by i 2 [0; 1 !) has access to …nancial market and acts as Ricardian.
I.e., each member of Ricardian households i maximizes its lifetime utility by choosing consumption, C R t (i), investment, I t (i), government bonds, B t (i), next period's capital stock, K t (i), and intensity of the capital stock utilization, z t (i), given the following lifetime utility function:
where, is the discount factor, c denotes the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, l is the inverse of the elasticity of work e¤ort with respect to real wages, and L 
The Ricardian household faces a ‡ow budget constraint:
where (z t (i)) is the cost associated with variations in the degree of capital utilization z t (i). The physical capital accumulation law for the Ricardian household is expressed as follows:
where is the depreciation rate, S( ) represents the adjustment cost function in investment. " i t is a shock to investment cost function and is assumed to follow a process:
The steady-state value of the capital utilization rate is set at z = 1 and the corresponding cost function is assumed to satisfy ( z) = 0. Moreover, the investment adjustment cost function is assumed to satisfy S (1) = S 0 (1) = 0.
Letting t and t Q t denote the Lagrange multipliers, the …rst-order conditions with respect to C R t (i), B t (i), I t (i), K t (i), and z t (i) are expressed as follows:
Here, Q t represents the shadow price of additional unit of capital. (j), the period-by-period budget constraint they face is given by: 
An independent and perfectly competitive employment agency bundles di¤erentiated labor, L t (n), into a single type of e¤ective labor input, L t , using the following technology: 
where W t w t P t is aggregate nominal wage index.
With probability 1 w , each Ricardian household i is assumed to be allowed to reset its wage optimally, unless otherwise it adjusts its wage partially according to the following indexation scheme:
where w measures the degree of indexation. The Ricardian household i, which is allowed to optimally reset its wage, is assumed to maximize its lifetime utility taking aggregate nominal wage, W t , and e¤ective labor input, L t , as given. Since the household knows the probability s w that the wage it chooses in this period will still be in e¤ect s periods in the future, the optimal wage, W R t (i), is obtained by solving the following problem: 
where 
Firms
where p t (f ) is the price of the intermediate good
Each intermediate-good …rm f produces its di¤erentiated output using an increasingreturns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas technology:
wherek t 1 (f ) is the e¤ective capital stock at time t given byk t 1 (f ) = z t k t 1 (f ).
is the e¤ective labor input bundled by the employment agency, and represents a …xed cost. " a Taking the real rental cost of capital, r k t , and aggregate real wage, w t , as given, cost minimization subject to the production technology yields marginal cost:
and the labor demand function at the aggregate level is given by:
Nominal pro…ts, d t (f ), of the intermediate-good …rm are expressed as follows:
which are distributed to Ricardian households as dividends. Aggregation gives:
As in the case of wage setting, sluggish price adjustment due to the staggered price contracts á la Calvo (1983) is assumed. A fraction 1 p of intermediate-good …rms can re-optimize their prices, unless otherwise they follow the price indexation scheme:
where p measures the degree of indexation.
An intermediate-good …rm f , which is allowed to re-optimize, knows the probability s p that the price it chooses in this period will still be in e¤ect s periods in the future.
Taking aggregate nominal price index, P t , and output, Y t , as given, the optimal price,
, is obtained by solving:
Aggregate price law of motion is then expressed as follows:
Fiscal and Monetary Authorities
The …scal authority purchases …nal goods, G t , issues bonds, B t , and levies taxes on consumption, labor income, and capital income at rates, The real ‡ow budget constraint for the …scal authority is expressed as follows:
We consider three feedback rules for each tax and a government spending rule in loglinearized form. The aggregate tax rates are assumed to positively respond to a predetermined debt-to-output ratio following FMS:
It should be noted that the government budget constraint and the tax policy rules described here allow partial debt …nance after a government spending increase, while the debt is to be repaid through tax revenue over time. The speed of …scal adjustment is determined by the coe¢ cient of the debt-to-output ratio. Government spending is assumed to follow a feedback rule that responds to output gap in log-linearized form:
The monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate according to a simple feedback
where t 1 log(P t 1 =P t 2 ) denotes in ‡ation rate. An i.i.d.-normal shock, R t , to the interest rate is assumed.
Aggregation and Market Clearing
Aggregate consumption, C t , and labor input, L t , in per-capita term are given by a weighted average of the corresponding variables for each consumer type:
and again, since all households supply the same amount of labor by assumption, aggregate labor input is given by:
Because only Ricardian households have access to …nancial markets, aggregate government bonds, B t , investment, I t , physical capital, K t , and dividends, D t , distributed by …rms are expressed as follows:
Finally, aggregate production equation and the …nal-goods market equilibrium condition are given by:
3 Bayesian Estimation of the Model
Preliminary Setting
In estimating the model parameters, we …rst log-linearize the model around the deterministic steady state and conduct Bayesian inference using the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method. The parameters are estimated for the Japanese data covering the period from 1980:Q1 to 1998:Q4. We utilize …scal data on government spending (calculated as the sum of government consumption and investment) and aggregate e¤ective tax rates on consumption and labor income. We also use the ordinary seven-part series typically employed in the literature, which includes output, private consumption and investment, labor hours, wages, the in ‡ation rate, and the interest rate. The aggregate e¤ective tax rates are calculated following Mendoza et al. (1994) . 7 All of the variables are detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott …lter.
The end of the estimation period is determined for both computational and empirical reasons. It is determined not to include the period during which a zero-interest-rate policy is adopted. 8 Moreover, Japan's …scal policy regime seems to have changed around 1999. The severe economic downturn in the aftermath of the Asian …nancial crisis in 1997-1998 forced the government to suspend its …scal consolidation e¤orts temporarily.
After that, because of the institutional reforms of the budget process that took place at the beginning of the 2000s, the government started to increase its focus on spending cuts as opposed to taxation as the dominant mode of …scal consolidation.
9
To illustrate the changes in the …scal policy regime in Japan, we estimate the following single-equation …scal rules using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method for di¤erent …scal instruments for the subsamples 1980:Q1-1998:Q4 and 1999:Q1-2008:Q1: Japan's …scal policy regime change around 1999.
-Insert Table 1 HereBecause the model is an extended variant of Smets and Wouters (2003) and based on its use as a tool for analyzing the Japanese economy in Iiboshi et al. (2006) and Sugo and Ueda (2008), we largely follow these studies in choosing prior distributions and in …xing several parameters that are di¢ cult to identify. Speci…cally, we set the capital share at = 0:3, the discount rate at = 0:99, the depreciation rate at = 0:06, the wage markup at w = 0:5, and the parameter for the elasticity of investment to the price of capital adjustment cost at & 1= S 00 = 6:32. The steady-state capitaloutput ratio and debt-to-output ratio are set at K= Y = 2:2 and B= P Y = 0:6, following Iiboshi et al. (2006) and Broda and Weinstein (2004) , respectively. We assume that Galí et al. (2007) and take sample period averages for the steady-state values for the government spending-to-output ratio and consumption, labor, and capital income tax rates. Compared with other DSGE-based estimates for the euro area and the U.S., the value is somewhat smaller. 11 The Calvo parameter for wage stickiness is higher, whereas that for price is lower than the INW and SU estimates. They are, however, largely in line with the results of Koga and Nishizaki (2005) . 12 Our estimate of the inverse elasticity of the labor supply is close to those of INW and SU. The parameter value for habit persistency is much smaller than that reported by INW but much larger than that reported by SU.
Estimation Results
SU conjecture that their small value for habit persistence is due to their assumption of internal habit. This paper assumes that habit is external, as does INW. On the other hand, that our value is smaller than that of INW may be attributable to the inclusion of non-Ricardian households. As Coenen and Straub (2005) note, this has the e¤ect of lowering the estimate of the parameter for habit persistency and raising that for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. In fact, the value of the estimated intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1= c is larger than that of INW. Overall, posterior means for structural parameters do not suggest that the government spending multiplier is large in this model.
-Insert Table 3 HereTurning to the policy parameters, we note that relative to those of INW, the estimated response of monetary policy to in ‡ation is weak, and the estimated response to the output gap is strong. The less aggressive stance of monetary policy towards in ‡ation may re ‡ect the di¤erence in the sample periods. 13 The posterior mean estimates of tax rule parameters that govern responses of tax instruments to debt-to-output ratio are all positive, although those of consumption and labor income tax rules are not reliably di¤erent from zero. The results are quite consistent with those of the OLS estimates of single-equation …scal rules reported in Table 1 , which suggests that capital income taxation contributed to debt stabilization to the largest extent during the 1980s and 1990s in Japan. Although the series of aggregate e¤ective tax rates on capital is treated as a latent variable in the MCMC estimation, we reach the same conclusion as that suggested by the OLS estimation in which capital tax data series is utilized. those estimated for Japan, we adjust the policy parameters tcb ; tlb ; and tkb for each tax rule so that the coe¢ cients of the debt-to-output ratio become equal to those of the FMS estimates. The adjusted policy parameters and the coe¢ cients are reported in Appendix Table A with those of our estimates and those of FMS's original estimates.
The coe¢ cients suggest that debt in Japan is …nanced largely through capital income taxation, whereas …nancing in the euro area is instead allocated rather heavily to labor income taxes. In the following exercise, all other parameter values are calibrated to the estimated means of the posterior distributions for the parameters unless otherwise noted.
-Insert Figure 2 Here - Figure 2 illustrates the dynamic responses of output, consumption, investment, and labor input to a government spending shock equal to one percent of the steady-state output under the estimated tax rules and those under the adjusted FMS tax rules for the euro area. Each dynamic response is depicted as a percentage deviation from the steady state and hence corresponds to the impact multiplier of Mountford and Uhlig (2009) . The impact multiplier for output in period k is de…ned as follows:
The output multipliers of the estimated model are larger in the initial periods than those when the adjusted FMS tax rules are employed; greater declines are shown in later periods. The upper right-hand and lower left-hand panels reveal that the greater output multipliers of the estimated model in the initial periods can be attributable both to the dynamic responses of consumption and to those of investment. A closer look at the patterns of output, consumption, and investment responses indicates that investment serves as a major driving force for the stronger output response under the estimated tax rule. The strong increase in investment re ‡ects the increase in the labor supply, which has a positive impact on the marginal product of capital. It is also traceable to a moderate increase in the interest rate due to the less aggressive monetary policy. In later periods, however, the estimated model exhibits large decreases in consumption, in investment, and thus in output. The decreases are brought about by delayed tax increases in response to debt accumulation. Because the main …nancing source for the estimated tax rules is capital income taxation, the decline in later periods is signi…cant for investment.
Note that the estimated model delivers a slight but positive consumption response in the initial periods. This is somewhat surprising because none of the estimated values of key structural parameters for …scal policy e¤ectiveness-such as the non-Ricardian share, price and wage stickiness, habit persistency, or labor supply elasticity-seem to generate the crowding-in e¤ect. In particular, the estimated share of non-Ricardian households in Japan seems to be too small to have precipitated the crowding-in e¤ect as suggested in previous studies (see Coenen and Straub (2005) 14 ).
Policy Experiments 4.2.1 Alternative Financing Schemes
In the following, we examine how di¤erent …nancing schemes a¤ect the e¤ectiveness of …scal stimulus. We consider three alternative tax-…nancing schemes: (a) one in which the consumption tax alone adjusts to stabilize debt (a consumption tax-…nancing scheme), (b) one in which the labor income tax alone adjusts (a labor tax-…nancing scheme), and (c) one in which the capital income tax alone adjusts (a capital tax-…nancing scheme).
The parameter values for the three tax-…nancing schemes are set as follows: (a a spending reversal and (e) a balanced budget. In the case of a spending reversal, the government spending rule is assumed to take the following form:
where gb captures the degree of future spending cuts based on the debt-to-output ratio.
We set g = 0:6 and gb = 0:2 C= G , where C= G = 2:5. For a balanced budget, we assume that the current labor income tax alone adjusts to meet the following periodby-period budget constraint:
Short-run Stimulative E¤ects
Figure 3 displays the impulse responses to a government spending shock under the …ve alternative …nancing schemes formulated above. We put the responses under the labor tax-…nancing scheme in both the right and left panels for comparative purposes. As in Figure 2 , the responses correspond to the impact multipliers.
-Insert Figure 3 Here -The top two panels show that the stimulative e¤ects of capital tax-…nanced spending exceed those under other …nancing schemes in the short term. Fiscal stimulus under the balanced budget scheme shows the smallest output response on impact. Because the balanced budget scheme does not allow any debt …nance, the negative wealth e¤ect on consumption becomes quite large. The initial rise in consumption is the largest under the capital tax-…nancing scheme. It should be noted that the hump-shaped rise in Ricardian consumption caused by the spending reversal occurs from the sixth quarter onward in the model. That is, the observed initial increases in total consumption are brought about by non-Ricardian households. The capital tax-…nanced spending leads to the strongest initial increases in investment as well, but a large decline occurs as the capital tax increases in later periods. Labor input also shows the strongest increase under the capital tax-…nancing scheme. Recall that the coe¢ cients of the estimated tax rules for Japan suggest that debt is repaid largely through capital income taxation, whereas its …nancing in the euro area is allocated rather heavily to labor income tax.
In comparing the responses shown in the left panels of Figure 3 with those in Figure   2 , we notice that the response patterns of output, consumption, investment, and labor input under the capital tax-…nancing scheme all show similar patterns to those under the estimated tax rules for Japan. On the other hand, the response patterns under the labor tax-…nancing scheme show similar patterns to those under the adjusted FMS tax rules for the euro area.
To assess the quantitative importance of changes in the multipliers brought by alternative tax-…nancing schemes, we compare the …rst-year average responses for di¤erent tax-…nancing schemes in Table 4 . The responses for di¤erent non-Ricardian shares are also presented for capital tax-…nanced spending.
-Insert Table 4 HereAs expected, the introduction of non-Ricardian households contributes toward a crowding-in e¤ect on consumption. The crowding-in e¤ect decreases as the share of non-Ricardian households declines. On the other hand, the investment multipliers become larger as the non-Ricardian share declines because non-Ricardian households do not own capital, and hence, the total investment in the economy increases as the share declines. Note that decreases in Ricardian consumption also become smaller as investment responds strongly.
Both consumption and labor tax-…nanced spending cannot generate the crowding-in effect on consumption with a relatively high non-Ricardian share (! = 0:4) in this model.
In contrast, the stimulative e¤ects of capital tax-…nanced spending are larger than those of consumption and labor tax-…nanced spending with a high non-Ricardian share, even when non-Ricardian households do not exist (! = 0:0). The results here indicate that a choice of tax rules can alter the consequences of a …scal stimulus program anticipated by the given non-Ricardian share.
Inspecting the Mechanism
In a general equilibrium framework, an (irreversible) increase in government spending needs to eventually be …nanced through a corresponding increase in taxation, even if it is …nanced by debt initially. Taxation creates a negative wealth e¤ect on consumption and leisure. The decrease in leisure is result of increased labor hours. The increases in labor hours induce capital accumulation because they have a positive impact on the marginal product of capital, making investment more attractive. Therefore, investment tends to rise after a permanent government spending increase in neoclassical models (see Aiyagari et al. (1992) ; Baxter and King (1993) ). The same basic forces apply in the face of a persistent increase in government spending (see Burnside et al. (2004) ). In New Keynesian models, however, investment tends to decline because strong monetary policy reactions lead to a rise in the real interest rate (see Linnemann and Schabert (2003) ; Cogan et al. (2010) ).
In our estimated model, …scal stimulus has persistent e¤ects, and monetary policy does not respond aggressively to in ‡ation. Therefore, investment increases through the above-mentioned neoclassical channel without being hampered by a real rate rise.
Because the model allows partial debt …nance and three distortionary taxes, debt repayment is to be …nanced via a split among consumption, labor, and capital income taxes. Regarding the role of di¤erent taxes, note that both consumption and labor income taxes have dampening e¤ects on labor hours because the labor supply schedule is related to the utility-maximizing choice between consumption and leisure on an aftertax basis. Hence, debt stabilization via either a consumption tax or a labor income tax limits the initial increase in labor input after …scal stimulus more than debt stabilization via a capital income tax. Labor input increases greatly under the capital tax-…nancing scheme, and so does investment. Although capital income taxation is harmful to investment, the speed of …scal adjustment or debt repayment is slow, and the increase in investment is strong enough to outweigh the distortionary e¤ects of capital taxation in the initial periods. The results here are closely related to the …ndings presented by Jones (2002) , which indicate that labor income taxation has a greater downward e¤ect on labor input-and, accordingly, on output-than capital income taxation does in a neoclassical framework.
Furthermore, in our New Keynesian model, the investment boom pushes up the rental rate on capital, but monetary policy does not react very aggressively to in ‡ation; it allows negative real interest rates, at least for a while. The negative real rate not only further increases investment but also induces Ricardian consumption to rise initially through the intertemporal substitution e¤ect. Hence, both investment and consumption respond positively to the capital tax-…nanced spending increase. Notice also that as we have seen in -Insert Figure 4 Here - 
Medium-and Long-run Consequences
Although this paper aims to address the e¤ect of short-run …scal stimulus under alternative …nancing schemes, it is important to remember their medium-and long-run consequences. Mountford and Uhlig (2009) suggest the present-value multiplier as a summary measure intended to capture the cumulative e¤ects of a …scal shock along an entire path up to a particular time. The present-value multiplier for output over a k-period horizon is de…ned as follows: Figure 5 depicts the present-value multipliers for output, consumption, and investment under alternative tax-…nancing schemes. When capital income tax alone is adjusted to stabilize debt, the present-value multipliers for output are the largest up to a three-year horizon. Over longer horizons, higher capital taxes lower investment, and thereby, the present-value multipliers for investment decrease below those under the consumption and labor tax-…nancing schemes. The present-value multipliers for consumption become negative within a two-year period, but the decline is smaller than under the consumption and labor tax-…nancing schemes up to a seven-year horizon.
-Insert Figure 5 Here - Table 5 reports the cumulative (horizon=1) present-value multipliers under alternative tax-…nancing schemes and under the balanced budget scheme. The capital income tax-…nanced spending increase has the largest adverse e¤ect on investment, consumption, and output. The cumulative present-value multiplier is slightly positive when the spending increase is consumption tax-…nanced and slightly negative when it is labor tax-…nanced. As can be seen in Figure 3 , taxation on labor causes a larger decline in labor input than does consumption tax in later periods. Accordingly, the decline in investment is rather prolonged when the spending is …nanced by labor taxes. These long-run consequences are in line with the widespread consensus: taxes on capital are harmful to growth, 15 and taxes on consumption are the least distortionary. The cumulative present-value multipliers under the labor-tax …nanced balanced budget scheme are larger than those when labor income tax is adjusted to stabilize debt through the feedback rule, although the short-run impact multipliers are smaller, as shown in Figure   3 . The reason is that the labor tax feedback rule allows partial debt …nance initially, thereby making taxation partly delayed. Delaying the timing of taxation increases output in the short term; however, the output decrease caused by the delayed taxation may be larger than the initial increase (see Trostel (1993) ).
-Insert Table 5 Here - we use a quadratic approximation of the representative household's utility 16 as the welfare criterion. The change in welfare is expressed as the percentage of steady-state consumption equivalence. Because the utility function is assumed not to be a¤ected by government spending, the overall results are quite similar to those suggested by the cumulative present-value multipliers. The amount of welfare loss is the greatest if spending is …nanced by capital income taxes. A labor tax-…nanced spending shock has a larger negative impact on welfare than a consumption tax-…nanced spending shock does. Welfare loss is the smallest when a future spending reversal is prospected because it does not require an additional tax increase to stabilize debt. The results seem to indicate that a spending reversal policy is the most desirable. However, it should be noted that the results depend critically on the simplifying assumption that government spending is completely wasteful in our model.
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The results of this study suggest that output decline and welfare loss are, in the long term, greatest under the capital tax-…nancing scheme. As previously discussed, a capital tax-…nanced spending shock induces an investment boom in the initial periods if the speed of …scal adjustment is slow. This is because capital taxation has the smallest adverse e¤ect on the increase in the labor supply. An accommodative monetary policy plays a critical role in allowing the real interest rate to decline in the short term.
However, as debt is repaid over time, the initial stimulative e¤ects are dominated, in the long term, by the distortionary e¤ects of capital taxation. Because capital taxation creates intertemporal wedges, the distortionary e¤ects become excessively greater with longer horizons, especially in the presence of imperfect competition (see Judd (2002) ;
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2006)). Thus, it is important when designing …scal stimulus packages and …nancing schemes to take into account the long-run costs that arise from future tax burdens. Nevertheless, as Uhlig (2010) notes, the bene…ts of a faster recovery, as brought about by a …scal stimulus program, can be greater than their long-run costs depending on the norms at play (for example, how a government will act in a recession). 18 In fact, the central issue in the …scal stimulus debate among policy-makers most often regards the size of the multiplier in the short term. Capital taxation has the smallest dampening e¤ect on labor input, and the increase in labor input is the key factor contributing to the e¤ectiveness of …scal stimulus in a general equilibrium framework, as shown by Aiyagari et al. (1992) and Baxter and King (1993) . Therefore, to improve the e¤ectiveness of the stimulus, future taxation for debt repayment is better allocated to capital tax instead of labor-dampening taxes, such as consumption and labor income taxes. In light of this paper's …nding that a prospective future …nancing scheme considerably a¤ects the size of the short-run multiplier, governments are advised to announce both stimulus plans and …nancing schemes at the same time to ensure the e¤ects are predictable.
There are some further points regarding the possible extension of this model that should be noted. First, this paper restricts its analysis to the case in which both …scal and monetary policy rules are stable and linear. However, policy rules are likely to change over time (see e.g. Davig and Leeper (2007); Chung et al. (2007) ; Davig and Leeper (2011) ). Embedding the possibility of a policy regime change in the model is therefore an important avenue to be explored. In addition, the recent crisis highlights the importance of …scal stimulus when nominal interest rates are at zero, the lower bound (see e.g. Christiano et al. (2009); Erceg and Lindé (2010); Woodford (2011) ).
It would be interesting to extend our analysis to a "liquidity trap" scenario, in which monetary policy rule cannot be approximated by a linear function. Second, further research could entail incorporating the productivity-enhancing and/or utility-enhancing features of government spending into the model because it is commonly believed that government spending can have a direct e¤ect on the production and utility function (see e.g. Kamps (2004) ; Linnemann and Schabert (2006) ; Bouakez and Rebei (2007) ).
The incorporation of these features may increase the size of the government spending multiplier and provide broader implications to welfare analysis, and therefore deserves high priority in future research.
Notes
1 The aggregate e¤ective tax rates are calculated using the method proposed in Mendoza et al. (1994) . The method is intended to construct measures of tax rates that are consistent with the concept of aggregate tax rates at the macro-level. The calculation is based on macroeconomic data, such as tax revenue and national accounts. Their relatively simple methodology is found to be useful in approximating the tax rates faced by the representative agent in DSGE models (see Jones (2002); Forni et al. (2009); Leeper et al. (2010a) ).
2 The movements in the e¤ective tax rate on capital broadly re ‡ect the changes in Japan's statutory corporate tax rate, which was raised in 1981 and 1984, and reduced in 1987, 1989, and 1990. 3 Similar expenditure rules can be found in Leeper and Yang (2008) and Forni et al. (2010) .
4 Ludvigson (1996) also …nds that a debt-…nanced government spending increase is expansionary, whereas a distortionary tax-…nanced increase is contractionary.
5 The non-Ricardian households are usually assumed as liquidity-constrained and hence cannot smooth consumption intertemporally. A government spending shock typically generates a negative wealth e¤ect, which induces forward-looking households to decrease consumption in a general equilibrium framework. On the contrary, empirical studies using a standard VAR approach tend to …nd that private consumption rises after a government spending shock (see Fatás and Mihov (2001); Blanchard and Perotti (2002); Perotti (2007) ). Galí et al. (2007) …rst introduced the non-Ricardian households to a simple DSGE model and have shown that it is possible to have the crowding-in e¤ect on consumption.
Introduction of non-Ricardian households is quite popular among the current workhorse DSGE models at policy institutions (see Kumhof et al. (2010) ).
6 A habit is called external if it is a¤ected by the average consumption level of the economy, which is exogenous for each agent. On the other hand, it is called internal if the agent's habit is directly a¤ected by its past consumption. 7 The series of e¤ective tax rates on capital income is also calculated. The obtained data series is too volatile, however; it is therefore treated as a latent variable whose value cannot be observed directly in the MCMC estimation. 8 The zero lower bound on interest rates requires us to deal with two di¢ cult problems in a DSGE framework: non-linearity and indeterminacy (see Braun and Waki (2006) From a more empirical point of view, Fatás and Mihov (2009) argue that "the …scal cost of not stabilizing the economy is likely to be much higher than the cost of a de…cit that helps the economy go faster towards a recovery path." Mendoza et al. (1994) . Government spending is the sum of government consumption and investment. In calculating debt-to-output ratio, debt held by the government is excluded. 8 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 Japan: Capital tax rate and debt-to-output 8 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 Other countries: Capital income tax rate Notes: Capital income tax rates are taken from " Mendoza-Razin-Tesar effective tax rates updated through 1996,"which is available at http://econ-server.umd.edu/~mendoza/. In calculating Japan' s debt-to-output ratio, debt held by the government is excluded. dotted lines-consumption tax-financing.
